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Book Review
BANKRUPTCY PROFESSIONALS, DEBTOR
DOMINANCE, AND THE FUTURE OF
BANKRUPTCY: A REVIEW AND A RHAPSODY ON
A THEME
DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF
BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA.
David A. Skeel, Jr., Princeton University Press, 281
pp. (2001)
Reviewed by
ThomasE. Plank*
David Skeel's book, Debt's Dominion: A History of Bankruptcy Law
in America,1 ("Debt's Dominion') presents the fascinating political
history of American bankruptcy law. Applying public choice
theory-primarily interest group theory-this book examines the
three forces that have shaped bankruptcy law in America: the self
interest of debtors, creditors, and bankruptcy professionals. In
particular, it presents a detailed analysis of the enactment of the two
important pieces of twentieth century bankruptcy legislation: the
addition of bankruptcy reorganization to the Bankruptcy Act of
* Associate Professor of Law, University of Tennessee College of Law; A.B., Princeton
University (1968); J.D. University of Maryland (1974). Many thanks to George Kuney and
Jonathan Lipson for their invaluable comments on this review.
' DAVID A. SKEEL, JR., DEBT'S DOMINION: A HISTORY OF BANKRUPTCY LAW IN AMERICA

(2001).
337

BANKRUPTCY DEVELOPMENTSJOURNAL

[Vol. 18

1898 during the New Deal years of 1933 through 1938, and the
enactment of the Bankruptcy Code of 1978 ("Code").
Happily, Debt's Dominion does not overwhelm the reader with
economic analysis. Debt'sDominion weaves the analysis of the role of
these three large interest groups into a coherent description of the
contributions of ideology, political parties, regional conflict, the
tensions between national and local interests, and specific
individuals in shaping the development of bankruptcy law. It is well
written; it is highly informative; and it makes a significant
contribution to understanding not only the history of bankruptcy
law but also the dynamics of bankruptcy law.
Debt's Dominion also reveals how the interests of bankruptcy
professionals have most recently dominated the bankruptcy system.
In my view, this dominance has produced a Code that currently tilts
in favor of debtors, especially debtors-or to be more precise, the
management of corporate debtors-purporting to reorganize under
chapter 11. This pro-debtor slant has allowed a growing use of the
bankruptcy process for purposes that have little or nothing to do
with resolving the problem of financial or economic distress of
debtors unable to repay their creditors. This use has, in turn,
produced a growing belief among other non-debtors-prospective
borrowers and creditors-that the current Code and its application
are both fundamentally unfair and wasteful. This realization has
engendered several responses.
Some of these, such as the
increasingly ambitious efforts of the credit card industry to curb the
use of consumer bankruptcy by those with the presumed means of
repaying their debts, the book describes well. Other responses
follow the basic theme of the development of bankruptcy law
described in Debt's Dominion. Later this review briefly describes two
significant responses: (1) the promulgation and enactment of
Revised Article 9, and (2) the dramatic growth of securitization.
Both of these developments exhibit the same pattern of
development described by Debt'sDominion.
BANKRUPTCY LAW'S PAsT

Debt's Dominion is neatly organized into eight chapters that
alternate between individual and corporate bankruptcy, each of
which discusses a discrete part of the history of bankruptcy. The
first chapter summarizes the political and economic interests that
contributed to the enactment and repeal of the first three American
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bankruptcy acts. In the first 100 years of the United States, Congress
enacted bankruptcy acts, which generally provided for the
liquidation of a debtor's assets for distribution to creditors, only in
response to severe national economic recessions: the Act of 18002
following the recession of 1793;3 the Act of 18414 following the Panic
of 1837; 5 and the Act of 18676 following the Panic of 1857, which
had been interrupted by the Civil War.7 After these recessions
ended, however, none of these Acts survived because of a lack of
agreement among creditor and borrower interests and commercial
and rural interests over the desirability of federal bankruptcy
legislation.8
During the nineteenth century, politicians representing
creditor interests, in particular creditors from the northeastern part
of the United States, wanted a federal bankruptcy act to make
national creditor collection efforts more effective. 9 Politicians
representing borrower interests and politicians from less
commercially developed states feared that a federal bankruptcy act
would cause defaulting borrowers to lose their property and would
also disadvantage local creditors. Compounding the difficulty of
reaching agreement was a three way split among those legislators
who wanted no bankruptcy act; those who wanted only a voluntary
bankruptcy regime, that is, an act that would allow only the
borrower to initiate a bankruptcy case; and those who wanted the

Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19 (repealed 1803).
See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 25.
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440 (repealed 1843).
SeeSKEEL, supranote 1, at 25.
Act of Mar. 2, 1867, ch. 176,14 Stat. 517 (repealed 1878).
7 SeeSKEEL, supranote 1, at25.
Although the Act of Apr. 4, 1800, ch. 19, 2 Stat. 19, was to expire in five years, id. § 64,
2 Stat. at 36, Congress repealed it after three years because it proved to be so unpopular. Act
of Dec. 19,1803, ch. 6,2 Stat. 248. SeeVern Countryman, A History ofnAmerican Bankruptcy Law,
81 COM. L.J. 226, 228 (1976); Thomas E. Plank, The ConstitutionalLimits of Bankrupty, 63
TENN. L. REV. 487, 534 (1996) [hereinafter Plank, ConstitutionalLimits]; CharlesJ. Tabb, The
History of the Bankruptcy Laws in the United States, 3 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 5, 15 (1995). The
Act of Aug. 19, 1841, ch. 9, 5 Stat. 440, lasted even less time than the Act of 1800; Congress
repealed the Act of 1841 after only 18 months. SeeAct of Mar. 3,1843, ch. 82,5 Stat. 614. See
Plank, ConstitutionalLimits, supra,at 538; Tabb, supra, at 118. The Act of 1867 lasted longer,
but it too was repealed in 1878. See Act of Sept. 1, 1878, ch. 160, 20 Stat. 99; Plank,
ConstitutionalLimits, supra,at 538-39.
See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 26.
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bankruptcy act to include an involuntary regime that would allow
creditors to initiate a proceeding against a borrower."0
The enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 followed the
same tortuous path as had the earlier acts, but with one difference:
creditor groups emerging during the latter nineteenth century were
better organized and more effective at pressuring lawmakers.
Nevertheless, procreditor forces had to contend with and make
concessions to strong pro-debtor, populist, agrarian, and states'
rights sentiments in the Congress, and it took almost seventeen
years of negotiation before the Act of 1898 became law."
Interestingly, one of the compromises necessary to obtain
enactment of the Act planted the seeds for the ultimate
permanence of bankruptcy law in America. To reduce the concerns
about federal power over debtors and the high costs of a bankruptcy
system, the 1898 Act placed the administration of bankruptcy into2
the hands of referees paid from the estates being administered.
This choice fostered the development of the bankruptcy
professionals, judges (the successors to the referees), trustees,
practitioners, and academics, who became the third force in
shaping twentieth century American bankruptcy law, a force that
Professor Skeel describes as "the single most important influence on
the development of bankruptcy law" since 1898.1
Chapter 1 sets the stage for the remainder of the book: the
interplay of pro-creditor interests, pro-debtor interests, and the
interests of the bankruptcy professionals. It summarizes 100 years of
economic and political history in twenty-five pages. I would have
preferred a fuller treatment of the development of the history of
bankruptcy law in the nineteenth century. On the other hand, a
detailed history of this period may have gotten in the way of the
more fascinating story, the role of the bankruptcy professionals, a
twentieth century phenomenon. The remainder of the Debt's
Dominion presents a richer picture, filled with detail, color, and
texture. Accordingly, any reader who continues beyond the first
chapter is well rewarded.
Chapter 2 steps away from bankruptcy legislation to analyze the
rise of the equity receivership during the last half of the nineteenth
10 See id. at 28-34.
11 See id. at 35-44.
12 See id. at 40-41, 44-47.
" See id. at 47.
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century. In the absence of any legislative guidance or authority, the
railroad managers, their Wall Street investment bankers and lawyers,
and federal judges created the equity receivership to resolve the
financial and economic distress of railroads. 14
The equity
receivership combined two settled legal doctrines-the traditional
power of a court of equity to appoint a receiver of assets, and the
traditional creditor suit to foreclose a mortgagor's equity of
redemption-in an entirely new way. Secured creditors and later
the railroad management itself would obtain appointment of a
receiver-typically a representative of management-to operate the
railroad while management and the investment bankers, who had
originally underwritten the railroad's secured debt, negotiated a
restructuring of the debt. These underwriters gained control of the
negotiations by obtaining the consent of the debt holders to act as
their agents. Upon completion of the negotiations and the approval
of a reorganization plan, the judge would complete the foreclosure
sale of the railroad to a newly reorganized entity that would have the
capital structure set forth in the plan. As provided in the plan, the
proceeds of the foreclosure sale received by the existing creditors
would consist of cash payments or securities of the new entity. For
example, secured bondholders of the previously insolvent railroad
might receive stock and secured debt of the reorganized entity. Not
limiting itself to analyzing the major legal issues in the equity
receivership, this chapter describes the motivations of the
participants in the process: the managers of the railroad; the
investment bankers and their lawyers who looked after the interests
of the creditors as well as their own; and the federal judges.

" Neither the Bankruptcy Act of 1867 nor the Bankruptcy Act of 1898 contained
provisions for the reorganization of large corporations. The 1898 Act contained only limited
provisions for an "arrangement." A bankrupt could propose to his creditors a plan for the
composition of his debts that would allow the bankrupt to retain the bankrupt's property, and
the composition could be confirmed only with the consent of a majority of the creditors
whose claims had been allowed (measured by both the number of creditors and the amount
of allowed claims). See Bankruptcy Act, ch. 541, § 12, 30 Stat. 544, 549-50 (1898) (codified as
amended at 11 U.S.C. § 30 (1926) (repealed 1933)). In 1874, Congress amended the
Bankruptcy Act of 1867 to allow a debtor to enter into a composition agreement or extension
agreement that would allow the debtor to retain her property and that would be binding on
all unsecured creditors if a majority in number and 75% in value agreed. Act of June 22,
1874, ch. 390, § 17, 18 Stat. 178, 182-83 (repealed 1878). This extension of bankruptcy law
was upheld in In re Reiman, 20 F. Gas. 490, 492 (S.D.N.Y. 1874) (No. 11,673), affd, 20 F. Gas.
500, 501 (C.C.S.D.N.Y. 1875) (No. 11,675). See Plank, ConstitutionalLimits, supranote 8, at
539-40.
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This equity receivership developed before and independent of
the enactment of the Bankruptcy Act of 1898. Nevertheless, as we
learn later, important features of the equity receivership described
in chapter 2 reappear in later bankruptcy law: the belief that
reorganization and the alleged preservation of jobs and going
concern value is a worthy goal by itself; control of a reorganization
by the managers who often use the reorganization process to pursue
their own interests; and the enormous personal interest that
bankruptcy judges and bankruptcy lawyers have in reorganization.
Returning to the development of bankruptcy legislation,
chapter 3 of Debtor's Dominion tells the remarkable story of the
survival of the portion of the bankruptcy bar involved in liquidations
under Chapter VII of the 1898 Act. By the beginning of the New
Deal, these bankruptcy lawyers had developed an unsavory
reputation. Two detailed investigations of bankruptcy practice
under the 1898 Act-one conducted by William Donovan for the
Association of the Bar of New York, and one directed by former
federal
judge
and
then
Solicitor
General
Thomas
Thacher-examined the practice of lawyers who were members of
the "bankruptcy ring." These lawyers would solicit votes from
creditors and use this voting power to arrange for their election as
trustee or selection as the trustee's counsel, the principal source of
fees in a liquidation. The Thacher report proposed the creation of
federal bankruptcy administrators under the United States Attorney
General to control the bankruptcy case.' 5 This proposal found its
way into bankruptcy bills introduced in Congress in 1932. Despite
the support of groups representing unsecured creditors, however,
the bankruptcy bar derailed these proposals. The bankruptcy
reform acts that emerged, while making modest improvements in
bankruptcy procedure, left the bankruptcy system 5 as it had
developed, in the hands of the bankruptcy professionals.
In contrast to the preservation of the bankruptcy liquidation
bar during the New Deal bankruptcy reform, chapter 4 tells the
dramatic story of the complete elimination by the Chandler Act of
1938' 7 of the role of the Wall Street investment banks and the elite
reorganization bar from large corporate reorganization. When
Congress first took up the task of bankruptcy reform in 1932, Wall
13 See SKEEL, supranote 1, at 78-79.
'6 See id. at 89-93.
" Act ofJune 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840.
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Street bankers and their lawyers favored the codification of the
equity receivership because of doubts about the federal court's
jurisdiction over the reorganization of ordinary corporations that
did not have the same aura of public necessity as the railroads. In
1933, Congress added new section 77 to the 1898 Act to govern the
reorganization of railroads, 8 and in 1934 Congress added new
section 77B to govern the reorganization of corporations.1 9 Section
77 interjected the Interstate Commerce Commission into the
reorganization of railroads, but Section 77B left general corporate
reorganization in the hands of Wall Street bankers and their
lawyers. 0
Soon thereafter, corporate reorganization law changed
dramatically under the leadership of William 0. Douglas, initially
the head of the study mandated by the Securities and Exchange Act
of 1934 of the bondholder protective and reorganization
committees used in the equity receiverships 2' and later Chairman of
the Securities and Exchange Corporation. These efforts produced
Chapter X of the 1898 Act, added by the Chandier Act of 1938.23
" See Bankruptcy Act, § 77, added by Act of Mar. 3, 1933, ch. 204, 47 Stat. 1467. Section
77, codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 205 (1976) (repealed 1978), remained in effect until
the adoption of the Code.
9 See Bankruptcy Act, § 77B, added y Act of June 7, 1934, ch. 424, § 1, 48 Stat. 911
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. § 207 (1934) (repealed 1938)).
See SKEEL, supranote 1, at 107.
2!
See Securities and Exchange Act, § 211, enacted by Act ofJune 6, 1934, ch. 404, § 211,
48 Stat. 881,909.
2 See SKEET, supranote 1, at 107-19.
See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 101-276, as added by Act ofJune 22,1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat. 840,
883-905 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 501-676 (1976) (repealed 1978)). Congress also
added Chapter XI for the adjustment of the unsecured debt of smaller businesses;
Chapter XII for the adjustment of real estate debt of individuals and partnerships; and
Chapter XIII for the adjustment of debts of wage earners. See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 301-399 [ch.
XI], 401-526 [ch. XII], 601-686 (ch. XIII], as added by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, 52 Stat.
840, 905-38 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 701-799 [ch. XI], 801-926 [ch. XII], 10011086 [ch. XIII] (1976) (repealed 1978)).
In 1934, Congress had added a Chapter IX dealing with the insolvency of governments
and their agencies. See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 78-80, as added by Act of May 24, 1934, ch. 345, 48
Stat. 798, as amended by Act of April 10, 1936, ch. 186, 49 Stat. 1198, and Act of April 11, 1936,
ch. 210, 49 Stat. 1203. The Supreme Court declared this Act unconstitutional in Ashton v.
Cameron County Water Improvement Dist. No. One, 298 U.S. 513, 531-32 (1936). Congress
enacted a new Chapter X for insolvent governments in 1937, Bankruptcy Act, §§ 81-84, as
added by Act of Aug. 16, 1937, ch. 657, 50 Stat. 653, 654 and renumbered this Chapter to
Chapter IX in the Chandler Act of 1938, Act ofJune 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 3(a), 52 Stat. 840,
939. Congress amended this Chapter on several occasions, and in 1976, it was completely
revised. See Pub. L. No. 94-260, 90 Stat. 315 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 401-418
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Chapter X radically altered the method of reorganizing large
corporations. In place of retaining the existing management under
the equity receivership or a Section 77B reorganization, Chapter X
required the appointment of a "disinterested" trustee,24 precluding
participation by existing management, their investment bankers, or
the bankers' lawyers. 25 Chapter X also froze out the investment
bankers and their lawyers by prohibiting the solicitation of votes
from debtholders until after a reorganization plan had been
approved, in lieu of the earlier practice by which investment banks
obtained control of the reorganization by soliciting the votes of debt
holders before negotiating a plan.26 Finally, it appointed the SEC as
the guardian of the interests of the publicly issued securities in lieu
of the investment banks and their lawyers.27
Even with the radical change wrought by Chapter X, however,
the bankruptcy legislation retained the minimalist approach to
government control over bankruptcy, leaving bankruptcy largely in
the hands of federal judges and bankruptcy referees, trustees, and
practitioners. Thus, although bankruptcy reform was an integral
part of the New Deal, the bankruptcy reform differed sharply from
the other New Deal reforms that created new federal agencies
staffed with federal employees with broad regulatory power. With
the exception of the elimination of the high profile Wall Street
investment banks and their lawyers (a somewhat insular and, in the
climate of the Depression, politically vulnerable group), this ironic

(1976) (repealed 1978)).
24 The bankruptcyjudge had discretion not to appoint independent trustees only if the
total indebtedness of the debtor were less than $250,000. See Bankruptcy Act, § 156, added by
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (1938) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 556 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
" The definition of a person who was not "disinterested" was broad: A person was not
disinterested if the person was (a) a creditor or stockholder of the debtor; (b) an underwriter
of any outstanding securities of the debtor or a person who had during the previous five years
been an underwriter of any securities of the debtor; (c) a person who during the previous two
years had been an officer, director, or employee of the debtor or underwriter, or an attorney
for the debtor or underwriter; or (d) any other person who has an interest materially adverse
to the interests of any class of creditors or stockholders. See Bankruptcy Act, § 158, added by
Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 888 (1938) (codified as amended at 11
U.S.C. § 558 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
' Professor Skeel also discusses the role of the Trust Indenture Act of 1939 in freezing
out the Wall Street bankers by requiring each bondholder to vote on a modification of the
principal or interest payments on the bond, and hence preventing such modification through
a majority vote of all bondholders. See SKEEL, supranote 1, at 121.
See id. at 119-22.
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result flowed directly from the concentrated efforts of the then
existing bankruptcy professionals.
Chapters 5 and 6 take us from the New Deal reforms to the
enactment of the current Code. The 1950s and the 1960s saw a
dramatic growth in consumer bankruptcy, which exposed the need
In 1970, Congress authorized the
for bankruptcy reform.
Commission on the Bankruptcy Laws of the United States to study
the 1898 Bankruptcy Act and to recommend reform. In 1973, the
Bankruptcy Reform Commission produced its Report29 that
included a proposed bill. 0 In 1978, Congress enacted the Code.3 '
Professor Skeel describes these changes in chapter 5.
As Professor Skeel notes, the Commission's Report and the
later enactment of the Code followed the same path as the Thacher
report and the New Deal revisions in one important respect.
Echoing the Thacher report,32 the Commission's report
recommended the creation of a bankruptcy agency in the Executive
Branch that would handle much of the administrative aspects of
bankruptcy.3 There would still be a need for bankruptcy judges,
but not as many. Under the Commission's proposal, the number of
bankruptcy judges would decline from about 220 to about 150, a
one-third reduction. Also, the creation of the proposed agency
would reduce the demand for consumer bankruptcy lawyers. "Not
surprisingly, bankruptcy professionals launched an immediate
assault on the proposed agency." 4 The bankruptcy judges produced
their own version of a reform bill that, also unsurprisingly, allowed
the judges to retain exclusive control over bankruptcy.33 After
See Bankruptcy Study Commission, Pub. L. No. 91-354, 84 Stat. 468 (1970), reprinted in
1970 U.S.C.C-ALN. 545; see also Kenneth N. Klee, LegislativeHistory of the New Bankruptcy Law, 28
DEPAUL L. REv. 941, 942-43 (1979) (discussing the formation of the Commission on the
Bankruptcy Laws of the United States).
" COMMISSION ON THE BANKRUPTCYLAWS OF THE UNITED STATES, H.R. DOG. NO. 93-137
(1973) [hereinafter COMMISSION REPORT].
s' Id. pt. 2. The Commission's act was introduced as S. 236, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 31,
94th Cong. (1975); S. 4046, 93d Cong. (1974); and H.R. 10792, 93d Cong. (1973). See
generally Kee, supranote 28, at 943-44 (discussing the introduction of the act into the House
of Representatives by Congressmen Don Edwards and Charles Wiggins, and into the Senate by
Senator Quentin Burdick).
11 U.S.C. §§ 101-1330 (1994).
See supratext accompanying note 15.
See COMMISSION REPORT, pt 1, supranote 29, at 51-66.
See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 143.
The judge's proposed actwas introduced as S. 235, 94th Cong. (1975); H.R. 32, 94th
Cong. (1975); and H.R. 16643, 93d Cong. (1973). A companion judges' bill was not
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extensive hearingss6 during the 94th Congress on both the
Commission's and the judges' proposed acts, representatives of the
Commission and the judges helped forge a compromise that was
introduced in the 95th Congress in a form substantially similar to
the current Code. 37 As a classic example of successful defensive
lobbying, these bills did not contain the proposed bankruptcy
agency and left bankruptcy in the hands of the judges, trustees,

practitioners, and debtors.
Further, as an example of the successful use of affirmative
lobbying, the revised legislation introduced in 1977 in the House

elevated bankruptcy judges to Article III status, that is, appointment
by the President for life terms.ss The revised legislation introduced
introduced in the Senate in the 93d Congress. See generally Hearings on H.R. 31 & H.R. 32
Before the Subcomm. on Civil & ConstitutionalRights of the House Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th
Cong. App. (1975-1976) [hereinafter Comparison of H.R. 31 & 321 (comparing the
Commission's act, H.R. 31, and the bankruptcy judges bill).
See Hearings on HR. 31 & HR. 32 Before the Subcomm. On Civil and Comm. On the
Judidary, 94"e Cong. (1975-1976) (spanning four volumes and 2700 pages and covering thirtyfive days of testimony, with over 100 witnesses); Hearingson S. 235 & S. 236 Before the Subcomm.
on Improvement in Judiciary Machinery of the Senate Comm. on the Judiciary, 94th Cong. (1975)
[hereinafter Senate Hearings] (comprising one volume of 1316 pages and covering 3 days of
testimony, with 75 witnesses); see also Klee, supra note 28, at 944 (noting that in contrast to the
93rd Congress, there was "intensive study of the bankruptcy legislation in both the House and
Senate ... during the 94th Congress").
" See H.R. 6, 95th Cong. (1977) (introduced January 4, 1977). The sponsors revised
H.R. 6 and introduced the revision as a successor bill, H.R. 7330, on May 23, 1977. H.R. 7330,
95th Cong. (1977). The sponsors then revised this bill and introduced the revision, H.R.
8200, on July 11, 1977. H.R. 8200, 95th Cong. (1977); see also Klee, supra note 28, at 945-47
(discussing the legislative history of the Code). The House amended H.R. 8200 several times.
The Senate began to work on a companion bill, S. 2266, in October 1977. After H.R. 8200
passed the House and was received in the Senate in February 1978, the Senate revised and
adopted S. 2266. Although similar to H.R. 8200, S. 2266, as approved, contained substantial
differences. Finally, after approving S. 2266 in September 1978, the Senate amended H.R.
8200, as passed by the House, by striking out the text and substituting all of S. 2266. See Klee,
supra note 28, at 947-53. For practical reasons, the sponsors could not use a conference
committee to reconcile the differences between the House and Senate bills. Accordingly, the
sponsors in the House and the Senate informally reconciled the differences. Just before final
passage of the Code, both the House and the Senate made last minute amendments to H.R.
8200 as passed by the House, and H.R. 8200, as amended by the Senate, to reconcile the
differences between them, and both houses accepted the final compromise. Congress
enacted these final versions as the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978. See Klee, supra note 28, at
953-56.
" See H.R. 6, 95th Cong. § 201 (1977); H.R. 7330, 95th Cong. § 201 (1977); H.R. 8200,
95th Cong. § 201(1977) (as introduced onJuly 11, 1977).
The Commission's act provided that bankruptcy judges be appointed by the President
for fifteen year terms and therefore not have the life tenure required for federal judges under
Article III of the Constitution. See COMMISSION REPORT, pt. 1, supra note 29, at 5-7, 85, 94-6,
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in the Senate, however, did not accord bankruptcy judges Article III
status but provided for appointment by the President for twelve-year
terms.3 9 As the result of the efforts of a different interest group,
federal judges that already enjoyed Article III status and were intent
on preserving their elevated positioni" the final reconciled version
of the Code provided for appointment of bankruptcy judges for
terms
by
the President
after
receiving
fourteen-year
recommendations from the judicial conference for the related
circuit.4'

Chapter 5 also recounts the successful efforts of reformers to
expand the scope of bankruptcy law by expanding the jurisdictional
reach of bankruptcy courts and by adopting broader definitions of
"property of the estate" and a "claim."4 2 It also describes the
unsuccessful efforts of different groups to make other significant
changes in bankruptcy law:

pt. 2, §§ 2-102(a), (b) at 15-6; S.236, 94th Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1975); H.R. 31, 94th Cong.
§§ 2-102(a), (b) (1975); S.4026, 93d Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1973); and H.R. 10792, 93d
Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1973); see also Comparison of H.R. 31 & H.R. 32, supranote 35, at 27.

This was not a surprising result given the presence of federal judges on the Commission and
the exclusion of bankruptcy judges from the Commission. SeeSKEEL, supranote 1, at 139.
The bankruptcy judges, however, did not seek Article III status in their bill, although
they sought to preserve their interests by proposing appointment by the judicial council of
their respective circuit for fifteen year terms instead of appointment by the President. See S.
235, 94th Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1975); H.R. 32, 94th Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1975); and
H.R. 16643, 93d Cong. §§ 2-102(a), (b) (1973); see also Comparison ofH.R 31 &H.R. 32, supra
note 35, at 27.
' SeeS. 2266, 95th Cong. § 201 (1977) (as introduced October 31, 1977); S. 2266, 95th
Cong. § 201 (1977) (as reported on August 10, 1978).
0 SeeSKEEL, supra note 1, at 157-58.
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1978, Pub. L. No. 95-598, § 201 (a), 92 Stat 2549, 2657
(1978) (codified as amended at 28 U.S.C. §§ 152, 153 (1976 & Supp. III 1979). In 1984, in
response to Northern Pipeline Constr. Co. v. Marathon Pipe Line Co., 458 U.S. 50, 59-60 (1982)

(holding that non-Article m bankruptcy judges could not adjudicate a breach of contract
claim by a debtor in possession against a third party who had not filed a claim in the
bankruptcy case), Congress provided for appointment of bankruptcy judges by the judges of
the United States Courts of Appeal. See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act
of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353, § 104(a), 98 Stat 333, 336 (codified as amended at 11 U.S.C.
§ 152(a) (1982 and Supp. 1 1984)).
" See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 148-49. Although I agree that the definition of "claim"
under the Code is significantly broader than that under the 1898 Act, I disagree with
Professor Skeel's characterization of the new definition of property of the estate as broader
than the former definition. The new definition of property of the estate is simpler, but not
substantially broader, than the former definition.
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the efforts of reformers to impose uniform exemptions on debtors in
bankruptcy and the successful efforts of different interest groups to
43
retain state exemptions;
the unsuccessful efforts of consumer advocacy groups to eliminate
the fraud exception to discharge and to eliminate reaffirmation of
debts by individual debtors; and
the unsuccessful efforts of creditor groups to exclude debtors with
the income-the "means"-to repay some or all of their debt from
Chapter 7 liquidation and a discharge of debts and to require the use
of some of that future income to pay past debts through the new
Chapter 13 arrangement for wage earners.
Nevertheless, the result of the necessary compromises gave the
consumer advocacy groups mild victories in requiring that
reaffirmations be approved by the court and the elimination of the
fraud exception to a discharge under a Chapter 13 plan.
Chapter 6 analyzes the development of corporate bankruptcy
after the New Deal. The Chandler Act had marked a complete SEC
victory over the Wall Street reorganization practice and the elite
reorganization bar. This victory did not, however, represent the
demise of bankruptcy professionals in reorganizations. Instead, the
SEC's victory over Wall Street planted the seeds for the demise of its
role in corporate reorganization and the development of a powerful
reorganization bar. Not surprisingly, except perhaps to the SEC
reformers, the use of Chapter X steadily declined because of the
understandable aversion of managers of financially distressed
corporations to ceding their jobs to a reorganization trustee."
Instead of filing under Chapter X, these managers filed petitions
under Chapter XI, despite the statutory limitation that a Chapter XI
The compromise was, and remains, truly bizarre. Debtors may chose either the
federal exemptions or the state exemptions unless the state specifically provides that debtors
may not use the federal exemptions. Over half of the states require individual resident
debtors to use only the state law exemptions. See, e.g., NAT'L BANKR. REV. COMM'N,
BANKRUPTcY: THE NEXT TWENTY YEARs 120 (1997); William Houston Brown, Political and
Ethical ConsiderationsofExemption Limitations: The "Opt-Out" as Child of the First and Parent of the
Second, 71 AM. BANKR. L.J. 149, 151 (1997) (arguing that states should not be allowed to opt
out of uniform federal exemptions).
" In 1939, there were 577 Chapter X filings, more than five times the average for the
remainder of its existence; in 1940 and 1941, there were 291 filing. Thereafter, annual filings
ranged from a high of 165 (in 1942) to a low of sixty-one with an average of less than 100. See
SKEEL, supra note 1, at 126.

2002]

Debt'sDominion

plan could only address the corporation's unsecured debt.'
Chapter XI did not require the appointment of a trustee and
therefore allowed the managers to control the reorganization
process. This use of Chapter XI in turn led to the expansion of the
existing non-elite bankruptcy bar into reorganizations. By the
1970s, when Congress took up the question of reforming the
Bankruptcy Act of 1898, the bankruptcy professionals--judges,
practicing lawyers, and academics--had developed both the
expertise and the coherent identity of interests and organizational
structures to influence the coming reform of reorganization.
Chapter 6 describes how the reformers replaced the New Deal
model of large corporate reorganizations, with the SEC acting as the
protector of investor interests, with the Chapter 11 system
resembling what largely developed under Chapter XI by the nonelite bankruptcy bar. This system placed reorganization in the
hands of managers of troubled corporations and their
reorganization attorneys. A concentrated, knowledgeable interest
group successfully attacked a system of reorganization that had little
interest group support and that was also largely ineffective. In this
regard, the new version of corporate reorganization is surely
superior to the system that existed under Chapters X, XI, and XII of
the Bankruptcy Act.
The Code enacted in 1978 created a more efficient process for
adjusting the relationship between insolvent debtors and their
creditors, by giving both individual debtors and the managers of
troubled corporations greater control over the process. This greater
control, however, also allows greater abuse of the bankruptcy
process. This opportunity for abuse has increased the awareness of
creditors, both secured and unsecured, of the costs of the current
bankruptcy system to non-debtors. In the last part of the Debt's
Dominion, Professor Skeel describes some of the responses of the
creditor community to this awareness, and the opposition of the
bankruptcy professionals to changes in the system. Chapter 7
discusses the efforts of unsecured creditors, in particular the issuers

" See Bankruptcy Act, §§ 306(1) (defining "arrangement" to mean a plan relating to
unsecured debts), 307 (defining debt as unsecured debt and creditors as persons holding
unsecured debts), 356 (providing that a plan shall include provisions for the modification of
unsecured debts), 371 (providing that confirmation of an arrangement discharged unsecured
debts and liabilities), as added by Act of June 22, 1938, ch. 575, § 1, 52 Stat. 840, 910, 912
(codified as amended at 11 U.S.C. §§ 706(1), 707, 756, 771 (1976) (repealed 1978)).
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of credit cards, to reduce consumer bankruptcy filings, and chapter
8 discusses the largely ineffective efforts of creditors to cut back on
Chapter 11 bankruptcies.
As chapter 7 of Debt's Dominion notes, consumer bankruptcy
filings exploded under the 1978 Code from 172,000 filings in 1978
to 1.4 million filings in 1998.46 These filings have followed the
growth of the consumer finance industry.
The credit card
companies blame the Code and the ease with which debtors can file
a Chapter 7 petition. Most bankruptcy professionals and consumer
advocates, on the other hand, blame the consumer finance industry
for inducing debtors to borrower more than they can repay.
Professor Skeel describes the maneuvers of each side extremely well:
the specific policy issues reflected in current law and proposed
changes; the arguments and interests of the different groups; and
the political climate in which the debate has occurred.
Under Chapter 7 of the Code, consumer debtors may liquidate
their property-which may be small or non-existent-and discharge

16

See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 136-37.

According to a press release by the American

Bankruptcy Institute, the year 2001 saw the largest number of bankruptcy filings in history.
See Press Release, ABIWorld, Bankruptcy Filings Set Record in 2001, available at
http://~iv.abiworld.org/release/4q01.html (last visited Feb. 19, 2002) (citing date released
by the Administrative Office of the U.S. Courts and noting that the number of new
bankruptcies filed during calendar year 2001 rose to a historic high of 1,492,129 cases, a
nineteen percent increase from the 1,253,444 cases filed in 2000, that total Chapter 7 filings
were 1,054,975, a 23 percent increase from 859,220 in 2000, Chapter 13 filings increased by 11
percent from 383,894 for the same period in 2000 to 425,292 and that Chapter 11 filings rose
sixteen percent from 9,884 to 11,424, spurred by a record number of large public company
filings).
" The only part of this story that threw me off was his discussion of the "moral
confusion" surrounding Chapter 13 for individuals with regular income. Professor Skeel
describes the use of various "bribes" to induce individuals to file for Chapter 13, including a
discharge of fraudulent debts that is not available to individuals receiving a discharge under
Chapter 7. Consumer advocates had long charged that the consumer credit industry would
ignore misleading information provided by the borrower at the time of the initial application
for a loan and then use this misleading information as a way to exclude the loan from
discharge under the exception for fraud. The fuller discharge under Chapter 13 was a
compromise on this issue. See SKEEL, supra note 1, at 155. Later, in a section entitled "The
Moral Confusion in U.S. Consumer Bankruptcy," Professor Skeel suggests that bankruptcy
reform should reduce the strategic use of bankruptcy and "move toward a morally coherent
approach to consumer bankruptcy." See id. at 211. This suggestion, however, seems out of
place in this analysis of the contest between interest groups. Any such movement "toward a
morally coherent approach to bankruptcy" would require a definition of the "moral"
component in the debtor-creditor relationship, a subject outside the basic theme of the book:
the clash of self interested groups, a clash that, however "selfish" it might appear, produces in
the long run a "fairer" or more "moral" resolution of the competing interests.
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almost all of their debts, freeing their post petition income from the
claims of creditors. Another alternative, Chapter 13 of the Code,
allows individual debtors to retain their property and dedicate their
future income to the repayment of a portion of their debts under a
plan that they devise. One of the long-standing proposals of the
consumer credit industry requires that those debtors with the ability
to repay some or all of the debts from their future income do so,
primarily by denying those with the "means" to repay more of their
debts the alternative of liquidation under Chapter 7.
The consumer credit industry has been unsuccessful to date in
requiring "means testing" for Chapter 7. It did achieve a modest
step in this direction in 1984 when Congress authorized bankruptcy
judges to dismiss chapter 7 petitions for "substantial abuse.""
Presumably, debtors denied relief under Chapter 7 would file under
Chapter 13. This modest achievement turned out perhaps to be
nothing more than a fig leaf in reality as bankruptcy judges have
been reluctant to use this power in ways that provide much
assistance to the consumer finance industry.
The consumer credit industry, however, almost achieved a
more explicit form of means testing in the bankruptcy reform
legislation of the last few years. Indeed, Congress passed the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2000,49 only to see it pocket vetoed by

President Clinton on December 19, 2000. The bill that passed in
2000 was reintroduced in Congress in 2001, 0° but the House and
Senate passed somewhat different versions of the bills. These bills
are still hung up in a conference committee.
Returning to corporate bankruptcy, chapter 8 of Debt'sDominion
analyzes the development of reorganizations under the Code
through the end of the twentieth century. It covers the key and
interesting developments: the explosion of corporate bankruptcy
after the takeover boom of the 1980s; the use of bankruptcy by

, See Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 312, 98 Stat. 333, 355, amending 11 U.S.C. § 707 (1982 and Supp. II 1984).
" See H.R. 2415, 106th Cong. § 1 (2000) (providing for enactment into law of the
provisions of S. 3186 of the 106th Congress, as introduced on October 11, 2000 by the
conference committee for the House and Senate bills) (passed December 7, 2000) (Pocket
Vetoed by President Clinton December 19, 2000). The text of S.3186 is included in the H.R.
2415 conference report: H.R. REP. No. 106-970 (2000).
, See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S.220, 107th Cong. (Placed on the Calendar in
the Senate January 31, 2001; Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of
2001, H.R. 333, 107th Cong. (Passed by the House March 31, 2001).
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debtors to solve their mass-tort liabilities; the return of the elite Wall
Street law firms to large corporate reorganizations; the support of
progressive bankruptcy scholars for a reorganization regime that
repudiates the New Deal vision of reorganization and that
incorporates important features of the pre-New Deal equity
receivership; and the rise of law and economics theory questioning
the current process under Chapter 11 of the Code. The chapter
also describes important current issues in reorganizations and the
role of managers of debtors and bankruptcy professionals in these
debates: the largely unsuccessful use of bankruptcy waivers and the
more successful use of pre-packaged bankruptcies as a partial
avoidance of bankruptcy, the growing prominence of Delaware as a
venue for large corporate bankruptcies, the continuing debate over
absolute priority and the new value exception (by which the owners
of a corporate debtor attempt to retain some interest in the debtor
over the objection of creditors who have not been paid in full), and
the development of international insolvency regimes. Despite these
controversies, Professor Skeel predicts that, given the preferences of
the bankruptcy professionals, "it is difficult to imagine a set of
circumstances that would lead to serious alteration of the current
reorganization framework.... The expansion of U.S. corporate
reorganization is likely to continue as new crises arise, and there is
no obvious end in sight."5'
THE FUTURE OF BANKRUPTCY LAW

Debt's Dominion explains why, once the Bankruptcy Act of 1898
had survived its infancy, bankruptcy professionals obtained more
influence over the shape of bankruptcy law than either the creditor
or debtor interests. To be sure, on specific issues, creditor interests
resisted proposed changes. For example, banks had consistently
and successfully defeated attempts to eliminate their right of setoff 52 But, as a general rule, secured and unsecured creditors are too

diffuse to focus on the technical aspects of bankruptcy law, and in
any event, they can adjust their prices to reflect the allocations of
risks and losses created by any bankruptcy law. Similarly, borrowers
in general are too diffuse to lobby Congress for changes in

"
52

See SKEEL, supranote 1, at 236-37.
See id. at 182-83.
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bankruptcy law, and most do not anticipate becoming debtors
under the Code.
Bankruptcy professionals, on the other hand, have a direct
interest in the shape of bankruptcy law, they have an unmatched
expertise in the subject, and they are a much more concentrated
group. Accordingly, they have been able to influence the shape of
bankruptcy law. Much of this influence is undoubtedly good. The
very existence of the bankruptcy professionals of the early twentieth
century reversed the "boom and bust" cycle of bankruptcy
legislation of the nineteenth century described by Professor Skeel.
The successful efforts of bankruptcy judges, formerly known as
referees until 1973, along with those of bankruptcy lawyers and
practitioners, to elevate the status of bankruptcy judges has
produced a system of adjudication of remarkably high efficiency and
quality. The expansion of bankruptcy jurisdiction from the
summary jurisdiction under Chapter VII of the Bankruptcy Act of
1989 to the fuller, nationwide jurisdiction under the Code has
eliminated much needless waste.
On the other hand, the influence of bankruptcy professionals
has contributed to the growth of an increasingly pro-debtor
bankruptcy system, and especially a bankruptcy system that favors
managers of a corporate debtor in Chapter 11. Although there is
no evidence that the benefits of this pro-debtor/pro-management
tendency outweigh the costs to society, there is no question that this
pro-debtor growth has benefitted bankruptcy professionals.
Nevertheless, those who pay the costs for the pro-debtor tilt of the
Code are beginning to respond. This response is seen in several
different manifestations, and is, not surprisingly, led by other
interest groups who see themselves benefitting from the response.
Professor Skeel analyzes the response of one group, the credit card
industry. I will briefly discuss two other groups-of which I am
substantially, but not exclusively, a member: 3 1) secured lenders

5' Before becoming a full time law professor in 1994, I practiced law for nineteen years,
of which about fourteen years were spent serving as issuer's, bankruptcy, and underwriter's
counsel for the issuance of mortgage-backed and asset-backed securities and tax-exempt
housing bonds; counsel for purchasers, sellers, and servicers of mortgage loans and other
loans; lender's counsel in direct real estate and commercial lending; and owner's counsel in
selling, leasing, and financing real estate. Since 1994, I have continued to serve as a
consultant for Kutak Rock LLP, of which I was a partner from 1986 through 1994, and since
June 2001 have been Of Counsel to McKee Nelson, LLP, in both cases providing advice on
bankruptcy and security interest matters in securitizations and other real estate, commercial,
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and their lawyers, and 2) the investment bankers and their lawyers
involved in securitization.
Secured Creditors and Revised Article 9
After a more then ten-year odyssey, 4 the latest revision of
Article 9 has taken effect in all fifty states and the District of
Columbia.55 Some of the changes clarify issues under former Article
9 on which courts had disagreed. 6 Other changes expand the scope
of Revised Article 9 to include additional transactions 57 and property

and public finance transactions. I have also served as an expert witness in two federal court
cases involving securitizations, including serving as the expert witness for Abbey National
Treasury Services PLC, on the true sale of trade receivables and the proper structuring of the
LTV trade receivables securitization in In re LTV Steel Co., Inc, No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio 2000) discussed infra at text accompanying notes 84-94. I have derived substantial
economic and non-economic benefits from the existence of secured credit and securitization
and from my participation in these activities.
"
In 1990, the Permanent Editorial Board for the UCC established a committee to study
Article 9 of the UCC. The Article 9 study group recommended that a drafting committee be
formed to draft amendments to Article 9, and it made many recommendations for changes.
See PERMANENT EDITORIAL BD. FOR THE UNIF. COMMERCIAL CODE, PEB STUDY GROUP UNIF.
COMMERCIAL CODE ARTICLE 9 REPORT (December 1, 1992). A drafting committee was formed

in 1993, and its draft of Revised Article 9 was approved by the its sponsors, The American Law
Institute and the National Conference of Commissioners on Uniform State Laws, in 1998. See
U.C.C. § 9-101 cmt. 2 (2001); Steven L. Harris & Charles W. Mooney, Jr., The Article 9 Study
Committee Report: Strong Signals and Hard Choices, 29 IDAHO L. REv. 561, 562 n.2 (1993).
Symposium on Revised UCC Article 9, 74 CHI-KENT L. REv. 857 (1999). Additional minor
amendments were adopted in 1999, 2000, and 2001. See Uniform State Laws Scorecard, COM. L.
NEWSL. (ABA Section of Business Law/Unif. Com. Code & Fin. Serv. Comm.), Mar. 2002, at
17-18 & n.1.
0 See UCC RPT. SERV. STATE UCC VARIATIONS, Table of Enactments of 1999 Amendments at
xxv-xxvi (Sept. 2001); Uniform State Laws Scorecard, COM. L. NEWSL. (ABA Section of Business
Law/Unif. Com. Code & Fin. Serv. Comm.), Mar. 2002, at 17-18 & n.1.
, See, e.g. U.C.C. §§9-102(a)(3) & cmt. 13.a (providing a broader definition of
"proceeds" that rejects the holding of FDIC v. Hastie (In re Hastie), 2 F.3d 1042 (10th Cir.
1993) that postpetition cash dividends on stock subject to a prepetition pledge are not
"proceeds"); id. §§ 9-103 & cmt. 7.a (approving what some cases have called the "dual- status"
rule, under which a security interest may be a purchase-money security interest to some extent
and a non-purchase-money security interest to some extent and rejecting the "transformation"
rule adopted by some cases, under which any cross-collateralization, refinancing, or the like
destroys the purchase-money status entirely).
" For example, Revised Article 9 now applies to the sale of payment intangibles and
promissory notes. See U.C.C. §§ 9-109(a)(3). See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-101 cmt. 4 (providing a
general summary of the revisions made in former Article 9). Revised Article 9 also allows for a
limited security interest in certain general intangibles that are otherwise non-assignable. See
U.C.C. 9-408; Thomas E. Plank, The Limited Security Interest in Non-Assignable Collateral Under
Revised Article 9,9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 323 (2001).
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types.5' 8 Still other changes simplify the process of creating,
perfecting, or discovering security interests 9
In the context of the entire system of personal property security
interest, revised Article 9 represents, in my view, only a modest
expansion of secured credit. This expansion slightly benefits
secured lenders and their paying borrowers and arguably the paying
borrowers' unsecured creditors to the possible detriment of those
relatively few borrowers who become debtors under the Code and
their unsecured creditors. 6° Because most borrowers who become
debtors under the Code are insolvent, more protection for the
secured creditor might lead to less recovery for the unsecured
creditors of such debtors. On the other hand, although protection
against the trustee in bankruptcy and the unsecured creditors is an
important purpose of taking a security interest, it is not the only
purpose. Perhaps the most important role of a security interest for
any one creditor is the exclusivity that the secured creditor retains
against the property subject to the security interest. In other words,
if creditor A gets a security interest in a property item to secure a
$100 debt, no other creditor can get the same security interest in
that property item.
Nevertheless, the modest expansion of secured credit has
produced strong criticism from several members of one group of
bankruptcy professionals, the academics. Professor G. Ray Warner
calls Revised Article 9 the "anti-bankruptcy act.""1 He asserts that the
"Article 9 revisions will result in significant changes in bankruptcy
law. 62 He believes that Revised Article 9 will leave the debtor with
fewer assets to distribute to unsecured creditors or to finance the

For example, Revised Article 9 now allows for the creation of security interests in
deposit accounts, health care receivables, electronic chattel paper, and commercial tort
claims. See U.C.C. § 9-109(a) (3). See generally U.C.C. §§ 9-101 cmt. 4 (providing a general
summary of the revisions made in former Article 9).
See, e.g., U.C.C. § 9-502 & cmLt 3 (eliminating the requirement that the debtor sign a
financing statement); id. § 9-301(1) & cmt. 4 (providing that local law of the jurisdiction of
the debtor governs the perfection of a nonpossessory security interest in most goods and
other tangible property, in place of the former rule that the local law of the jurisdiction in
which most tangible property was located); id. § 9-307 (e) & cmt. 4 (providing that the location
of corporations and other "registered organizations" is the law of incorporation or other
registration and not the place of business).
All of the lawyers, however, benefit.
" G. Ray Warner, The Anti-Bankruptcy Act: Revised Article 9 and Bankruptcy, 9 Am.BANKR.
INST. L. REv. 3, 3-6 (2001).
Id. at 4.
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reorganization effort and make it harder for debtors to reorganize
without the cooperation of secured creditors.6 Other bankruptcy
scholars have also been critical of the expansion of secured credit by
Revised Article 9. 64 Some, including Professor Warner, have also
criticized the process by which Revised Article 9 was drafted and
enacted as favoring the secured credit industry.6
Whatever the merits of these criticisms-I strongly disagree
with much of Professor Warner's article characterizing Revised
Article 9 as the "anti-bankruptcy act'--the effort to strengthen
Article 9 in light of the pro-debtor tilt of the Code is no surprise.
Secured creditors have attempted to redress the balance of power
through amendments of the Code targeted to specialized creditors
or circumstances. Indeed, the current Bankruptcy Reform Act of
See id. at 5-6.
See, e.g. Lois R. Lupica, Revised Article 9, Securitization Transactions and the Bankruptcy
Dynamic, 9 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 287, 312-15 (2001) [hereinafter Securitization and
Bankruptcy] (arguing that securitization has the potential to pose a greater risk to a debtor's
unsecured creditors in bankruptcy than ordinary secured credit transactions and therefore
questioning the wisdom of Revised Article 9's facilitation of securitization); Lois R. Lupica,
Circumvention of the Bankruptcy Process: The Statutory InstitutionalizationofSecuritization,33 CONN.
L. REV. 199, 200-02 (2000) [hereinafter Statutry Institutionalizationof Securitization] (criticizing
Revised Article 9's putative facilitation of securitizations); Julian B. McDonnell, Is Revised
Article 9 a Little Greedy, 104 COM. L.J. 241, 242-43 (1999) (stating that the "U.C.C. specialists
who prepared Revised Article 9 decided to grab as much technical terrain as they possibly
could for the secured creditor."). There is also a large body of scholarly literature questioning
the desirability of secured credit. See, e.g., Symposium, The Priority of Secured Credit, 82
CORNELLL. REV. 1279 (1997).
0 See Warner, supra note 61, at 16-18; see also Edward J. Janger, Predicting When the
Uniform Law Process Will FaiL Article 9, Capture,and the Race to the Bottom, 83 IOWA L. REv 569,
618, 625 (1998) (arguing that the process by which Revised Article 9 was drafted and enacted,
requiring a uniform and enactable draft, contributed significantly to the failure to address the
presumed distributive consequences of Revised Article 9); WilliamJ. Woodward,Jr., The Realist
and Secured Credit: Grant Gilmore, Common-Law Courts, and the Article 9 Reform Process, 82
CORNELL L. REV. 1511, 1511 (1997) (lamenting the inability, in Professor Woodward's view, of
the Article 9 enactment process to address desirability of secured credit).
'
See, e.g., SKEEL, supra note 1, at 234-35 (describing additional grounds for relief from
the automatic stay for single asset real estate cases pursuant to 11 U.S.C. § 362(d) (3)). Many
of these amendments added exceptions to the automatic stay. See, e.g., id. § 362(b) (7) , as
added by the Bankruptcy Amendments and Federal Judgeship Act of 1984, Pub. L. No. 98-353,
§ 392(b) (1), 98 Stat. 333, 365 (1984) (excepting the setoff by a repo participant of any mutual
debt under certain repurchase agreements); id. §§ 362(b) (12)-(13), as added by Pub. L. No. 99509, § 5001 (a), 100 Stat. 1874, 1911-12 (1986) (excepting certain actions involving a Chapter
11 debtor brought by the Secretary of Transportation or the Secretary of Commerce to
foreclose certain preferred ship or fleet mortgages or security interests); id. § 362(b) (9), as
added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 116, 108 Stat. 4106, 4119
(1994) (excepting tax audits, demands for returns, and assessments); § 362(b) (17), as added by
Pub. L. No. 101-311, § 102(3), 104 Stat. 267, 267 (1990) as renumbered by the Bankruptcy

20021

Debt's Dominion

2001 contains several attempts by particular groups of secured
lenders to obtain better treatment in bankruptcy. 67 Revised Article 9
is another quite natural response by this one interest
group-secured creditors and their lawyers---to a perceived
imbalance of power in favor of other interest groups--principally
managers of borrowers who become debtors and their lawyers-who
benefit from a robust reorganization regime. The struggle between
those interest groups favoring the full voluntary use of security and
those seeking to reduce the impact of security interests in
bankruptcy will no doubt exhibit the dynamics described by
Professor Skeel. It is unlikely, however, that the pro-secured credit
crowd will cede much ground.
Either through their own experience with bankruptcy or
through the education from their lawyers on the effects of a
bankruptcy of their borrower, many secured creditors have become
more aware of the extent to which the Code deprives secured
creditors of the benefit of their nonbankruptcy entitlements. 6 This
awareness undoubtedly affects how they price credit, how much
credit they extend, and to whom they extend credit. The decisions
that secured creditors make on these issues in turn affect potential
borrowers. The accumulation of these effects may be sufficient
Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, § 501 (c), 108 Stat. 4106, 4144 (1994) (excepting the
setoff by a swap participant of any mutual debt under a swap agreement).
In addition, in 1994, Congress apparently eased the mortgagee's ability to perfect a
security interest in rents by allowing perfection by notice as a substitute for perfection by
seizure or commencing an action. See 11 U.S.C. § 546(b) (2) (1994), as added by the
Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994, Pub. L. No. 103-394, sect. 204, § 546(b) (2), 108 Stat. 4106,
4122 (1994). Congress also revised § 552(b)(2) apparently to allow the continuation of
security interests in rents but the statutory language is literally incompatible with revised §
546(b) (2). See 11 U.S.C. § 546 (b) (2) (1994), as added by the Bankruptcy Reform Act of 1994,
Pub. L. No. 103-394, sect. 214, § 552(b) (2), 108 Stat. 4106, 4126 (1994); see also David Gray
Carlson, Rents in Bankruptcy, 46 S.C. L. REV. 1075, 1145-46 (1995) (describing the interplay
between § 552(b) (2) and § 546(b) (2)).
' See, e.g., Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 220, 107th Cong. § 1201 (2001)
(expanding the provisions for relief from the automatic stay for single asset real estate by,
among others things, eliminating the $4 million cap on the amount of secured debt for such
real estate); Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer Protection Act of 2001, H.R. 333,
107th Cong. § 1201 (2001) (same).
" On the other hand, my colleague Professor George Kuney, an experienced Chapter
11 practitioner, has advised me that some secured creditors in bankruptcy have become adept
at deriving large benefits from the reorganization procedure. He is currently working on an
article tentatively entitled The Hijackingof Chapter11: Secured CreditorsHave Climbed the Learning
Curve, in which he argues that in appropriate cases secured creditors have used a large
number of techniques to turn a Chapter 11 case to their advantage.
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incentive to mount a significant challenge to the legal status quo. It
need not be the only impetus, however. Another incentive may be a
growing competitive disadvantage for significant portions of the
credit industry arising out of the dramatic growth of securitization.
Securitizationand the Avoidance of Most of the Bankruptcy Tax on Secured
Credit
Securitization is the transformation of loans-residential or
commercial mortgage loans, automobile loans, credit card
receivables, equipment leases and loans, student loans, trade
receivables, and other receivables-into securities that can be sold
in

the capital

markets.

9

One of the principal benefits of

securitization is that, despite the higher transaction costs of a
securitization, it saves money for the originators of loans7" and their
borrowers.7' Much of the savings created by securitization derives
from the unbundling of the risk associated with the assets being
See generally SECURITIZATION OF FINANCIAL ASSETS (Jason H.P. Kravitt ed., 2d ed. 1996
and Supp. 2001); TAMAR FRANKEL, SECURITIZATION: STRUCTURED FINANCING, FINANCIAL ASSET

POOLS, AND ASSET-BACKED SECURITIES (Little Brown & Co., Law & Business 1991); STEVEN L.
SCHWARCZ, STRUCTURED FINANCE: A GUIDE TO THE PRINCIPLES OF ASSET SECURITIZATION

(Practicing Law Institute, 2d ed. 1993); Committee on Bankruptcy and Corporate
Reorganization, Association of the City of New York, StructuredFinancing Techniques, 50 Bus.
LAW 527 (1995); Stephen I. Glover, Structured Finance Goes Chapter11: Asset Securitization by
Reorganizing Companies, 47 Bus. LAW 611, 613-14 (1992); Charles E. Harrell & Mark D. Folk,
FinancingAmerican Health Security: The Securitization of Healthcare Receivables, 50 BUS. LAW 47
(1994); Charles E. Harrell et al., Securitization of Oi Gas, and Other Natural Resource Assets:
EmergingFinancingTechniques, 52 Bus. LAW 885 (1997); Steven L. Schwarcz, TheAlchemy ofAsset
Securitization, 1 STAN. J.L. BUS. & FIN. 133 (1994); Steven L. Schwarcz, The Parts are Greater
Than the Whole: How Securitization of Divisible Interests Can Revolutionize Structured Finance and
Open the CapitalMarkets to Middle-Market Companies, 1993 COLUM. Bus. L. REV. 139 (1993);
Joseph C. Shenker & AnthonyJ. Colletta, Asset Securitization:Evolution, CurrentIssues and New
Frontiers,69 TEx. L. REV. 1369 (1991).
' In 1986, for example, General Motors Acceptance Corporation (GMAC) securitized
over $4 billion of automobile loans. A study found that this securitization saved GMAC an
annual amount equal to 1.3% on these securities in comparison with GMAC's costs of raising
money through traditional debt financing. See James A. Rosenthal & Juan M. Ocampo,
Analyzing the Economic Benefits of Securitized Credit, 1 J. APPLIED CORP. FIN. 32, 36-40 (1988).
This annual rate of savings translates roughly, over the life of the deal, into between $80 and
$100 million in cost savings.
"
Several studies have shown that securitization has lowered mortgage rates. See, e.g.,
Steven K. Todd, The Effects of Securitization on Consumer Mortgage Costs (2000) (unpublished
dissertation, Loyola University of Chicago), available at http://papers.ssm.com/sol3/
papers.cfm?abstractI=223585 (last visited May 6, 2000) (finding that in 1993 securitization of
mortgage loans saved consumers more than $2 billion in mortgage origination fees, but
criticizing the methodology of other studies all finding a lowering of interest rates).
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securitized from all of the other risks of the operations of the entity
originating the loans.
An originator of loans must raise money to finance its
operations. It can sell the loans or it can borrow money and grant
the loans as security for the debt. If it borrows money, the secured
lender takes both the risk associated with the assets and all other
risks associated with the originator's operations. If the originator
becomes a debtor under the Code for reasons unrelated to the
assets, the secured lender still suffers all of the disabilities that the
Code imposes on secured creditors. The most significant detriment
is the imposition of the automatic stay, which prevents any payments
to the lender. 2 Other detriments include the ability of the trustee
in bankruptcy (including the originator as debtor in possession) to
use the collateral, including the cash generated by the loans,7 3 to
force a creditor possessing the underlying loans to return the loans
to the trustee, 74 and to give a new lender a security interest in the
existing secured creditor's collateral that has priority over the
secured creditor.75 These provisions of the Code essentially allow for
the transfer of some of the value to which the secured creditor
would be entitled outside of bankruptcy to the debtor in
bankruptcy. This transfer imposes additional costs on the secured
creditor, which can be appropriately characterized as a bankruptcy
surcharge or bankruptcy tax.
The originator can also securitize the loans. By doing so, it can
either obtain a higher price for the loans or obtain lower financing
costs while retaining an indirect interest in the residual value of the
loans. Typically, the originator will create a bankruptcy remote,
special purpose entity ("SPE"), such as a corporation and sell the

n See 11 U.S.C. § 362 (a) (6) (2000) (staying any act to collect a claim).
Seeid. §§ 363(a)-(c).
" See id. § 542(a), interpreted by United States v. Whiting Pools, Inc., 462 U.S. 198,211
(1983). But see Thomas E. Plank, The Creditorin Possession Under the Bankruptcy Code: History,
Text, and Policy, 59 MD. L. REV. 253, 255-58, 301-05, 310-11, 339-44 (2000) (criticizing the
Court's failure to follow the statutory language of the Code, its use of weak legislative history
and its ignorance of direct, contrary legislative history and its too general policy analysis);
Thomas E. Plank, The Outer Boundaries of the Bankruptcy Estate, 47 EMoRY Lj. 1193, 1196-97,
1234-63 (1998) (critiquing the Court's analysis in Whiting Pools and its effect on the
interpretation of property of the estate under § 541 (a) (1) and explaining why it should no
longer be considered good law).
7'
Seell U.S.C. § 364(d) (1) (2000).
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loans to the SPE. The SPE will then issue debt securities secured by
and payable from the loans. 6
The transaction is structured to isolate the loans from the risk
of the bankruptcy of the originator. The sale from the originator to
the SPE must be a "true sale", and hence the loans would not be
part of the originator's bankruptcy estate if the originator became a
debtor under the Code. The organizational documents for the SPE
limit its activities to acquiring the loans and issuing the debt
securities to minimize the risk that the SPE would file a bankruptcy
petition for reasons unrelated to the performance of the loans. The
SPE will also be structured-by a requirement for a director
independent of the parent and detailed "separateness covenants" in
the SPE's articles of incorporation or other organizational
document-to operate as a separate legal person to ensure that it
would not be substantively consolidated with its parent, typically the
originator, if the parent became a debtor under the Code.

76

The consideration for the sale will be the proceeds from the sale of the securities and

the stock in the newly created SPE. If the SPE has already been established, then the SPE
must pay cash or other property for the loans for the full purchase price.
By selling loans to an SPE that the originator owns, the originator can retain, indirectly,
the residual value in the underlying loans that it originated. The SPE owns the loans, which is
now subject to a security interest to secure the debt securities that it issued, and hence it
retains the residual value in the loans remaining after payment of the debt. This residual
value, less the general expenses and liabilities of the SPE, is the value of the stock of the SPE
owned by the originator as parent of the SPE.
Securitizations can also use a "pass-through" structure. The originator can sell the loans
to a trustee and issue pass-through certificates representing 100% of the beneficial interest in
the underlying loans. The trustee has legal title to the loans and passes through the payments
on the loans to the certificate holders in accordance with the operative document, usually
referred to as a pooling and servicing agreement. In the simplest pass-through structure,
there would be no SPE. Many pass-through structures, however, also use an SPE. In these
structures, there will be multiple classes of certificates in which the most senior classes receive
the highest priority of payment of the available cash flow from the loans and the most junior
classes absorb any losses on the loans. For example, if there were four classes of certificates,
classes A through D, cash would go first to ClassA, then to Class B, then to Class C, and then to
Class D, to the extent available, either to pay interest in the order specified and then to pay
principal in that order, or all cash to pay both principal and interest in that order. From the
perspective of a lawyer structuring the transaction to avoid the consequences of bankruptcy,
the senior certificates represent debt, although they may not be debt for other purposes, and
the most junior certificates represent the residual value of the loans. Accordingly, because a
bankruptcy court might view the owner of these residual certificates as the "owner" of the
loans, these residual certificates would be transferred to and held by an SPE. Hence, from a
bankruptcy structuring perspective, multiple class pass-through certificates are essentially the
same of pure debt securities.
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By acquiring the loans and issuing debt secured by the loans,
the SPE and its secured creditors, the debt holders, assume the risk
that the loans will not perform as expected and that the debt will
not be repaid. The SPE and its secured creditors, however, will not
assume the other risks normally associated with an operating
company like the originator of the loans. By eliminating these other
risks, the SPE and the secured creditors can more easily predict the
risks associated with the loans themselves and the amount of
additional credit support usually required to ensure the repayment
of the secured debt. By structuring the cash flows from the loans to
provide the necessary credit support, the SPE can issue securities
that will receive an investment grade rating from a rating agency
that then facilitates the sale of the securities in the capital markets.
Securitization does not circumvent the Code. If the loans
owned by the SPE do not generate sufficient cash flow to repay the
secured debt, the secured creditors may attempt to foreclose on the
loans. The expected response is a bankruptcy filing by the SPE.
Securitization, however, avoids the risks associated with an originator
bankruptcy. Accordingly, an SPE that owns the loans and pledges
them as security for the debt securities can receive an investment
grade rating on its debt securities that an originator who owned and
pledged the loans could not achieve. Similarly, the SPE who owned
and pledged the loans could achieve an interest rate on its secured
debt lower than the interest rate on the secured debt of an
originator who owned and pledged the loans. 78

By separating the

risks associated with the assets from the other risks of the operating
company, securitization avoids the costs imposed on secured
Generally, the credit support for the securities must come from the loans themselves
and not from a guarantee from the parent of the SPE. The simplest form of credit support is
over collateralization. For example, a pool of receivables in the amount of $100 million might
provide sufficient cash flow, even after assuming levels of default several times higher than
historical loss, to support $90 million of securities with a AAA rating, the highest. Other
sources of credit support are financial guarantee policies, but the issuers of these policies base
their policies on the underlying loans and seek reimbursement for any payments only out of
the loans themselves.
Securitization is used by many originators who are too small or who do not have
sufficient equity to achieve an investment-grade rating for their debt securities. Originators
who are rated also use securitization to save costs. For example, when General Motor
Acceptance Corporation ("GMAC") securitized $4 billion of automobile loans, its traditional
debt securities had a AA rating. The securities backed solely by the loans received a AAA
rating. The cost saving for GMAG, however, resulted not from the difference in interest rates
but from the cost of maintaining the amount of equity required for GMAG to achieve a AA
rating on its own debt securities. See Rosenthal & Ocampo, supranote 70, at 32.
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creditors who lend to operating companies like an originator of
loans.
Securitization has become tremendously important in the
economy, and it continues to be one of the fastest growing forms of
capital formation. For example, the total debt owed by issuers of
asset backed securities-excluding mortgages-increased 183%
from $713 billion as of the end of 1995 to $2.02 trillion as of the end
of September 2001.. In contrast, outstanding corporate bonds of
issuers in the non-financial sector increased ninety-two percent
during the same period from $1.3 trillion as of the end of 1995,
about twice the outstanding debt of asset back issuers, to $2.48
trillion as of the end of September 2001."o In addition, as of the end
of 2000, there were about $5.32 trillion of single family mortgage
loans outstanding, of which about $2.93 trillion, or about fifty-five
percent, had been securitized.' Further, as of the end of October
2001, there were approximately $1.63 trillion of consumer credit
loans outstanding, of which $560 billion, or about thirty-four
percent, had been securitized s2
A few scholars have criticized securitization as detrimental to
the unsecured creditors of the originator."' Although I do not agree
that securitization is detrimental to unsecured creditors, underlying
the concern about the effect of securitization on unsecured
creditors of bankrupt originators is the fear that securitization could
reduce the amount of the bankruptcy tax that the debtor can collect
from secured creditors and that the debtor could use to finance its
reorganization efforts. Hence, securitization is seen as a threat to
managers of reorganizing debtors and the bankruptcy professionals
who benefit from reorganization efforts, regardless of how futile
they may be. Because of its dramatic success, however, securitization
See Board of Gov. of Fed. Res. System, Domestic FinancialStatistics, 88 FED. RES. BULL.
No. 2, A40, thl. 1.59, 1.47 (Feb. 2002) [hereinafter 2002 Statistics]; Board of Gov. of Fed. Res.
System, Domestic FinancialStatistics, 86 FED. REs. BuLL. No. 12, A40, tbl. 1.59, line 47 (Dec.
2000) [hereinafter 2000 Statistics].
See 2002 Statistics,A40, thl. 1.59,1. 8; 2000 Statistics,A40, tbl. 1.59, line 8.
8, See 2002 Statistics, A35, tbl. 1.54, lines 2, 55, 58, 61, 69. Of this amount, $500 billion
held in private pools and $2.43 trillion acquired from private industry and held by
government agencies and government sponsored enterprises. See id. at A35, thl. 1.54, lines 55,
58, 61, 69.
See 2002 Statisticsat A36, tbl. 1.55, lines 4, 10 (not seasonably adjusted figures).
See, e.g., Christopher W. Frost, Asset Securitization and CorporateRisk Allocation, 72 TUL.
L. REV. 101, 102 (1997); Lois R. Lupica, Asset Securitization: The Unsecured Creditor'sPerspective,
76 TEx. L. REv. 595 (1998).
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has created strong countervailing interest groups-Wall Street
investment bankers and the securitization lawyers. The struggle war
between these two sets of interest groups has already begun, and the
dynamics resemble the earlier struggles between interest groups
described by Debt'sDominion.
The debtor camp-primarily the promoters of the interests of
the managers of debtors-led an assault on securitization with the
bankruptcy filing of The LTV Corporation ("LTV"). LTV and fortyeight of its subsidiaries who produce and sell steel products had
established a securitization in 1994 to securitize the trade
receivables generated from the sale of their steel products. LTV
created an SPE, and its affiliated sellers entered into a revolving sale
agreement agreeing to sell their receivables to the SPE.84 The SPE
then entered into a revolving credit agreement providing for the
issuance to investors of highly rated notes secured by the
receivables." On December 29, 2000, LTV and its affiliates other
than the SPE filed for bankruptcy. 6

Alleging that they required

liquid assets to fund their reorganization efforts, the debtors sought
to repudiate the trade receivables securitization and recapture the
receivables. That same day the debtors immediately moved for an
order allowing them to obtain and use the trade receivables that
had been sold on the grounds that (i) the securitization was nothing
other than a disguised secured transaction and (ii) the inability to
use the trade receivables would cause the demise of the debtors and

, See Receivable Purchase and Sale Agreement, dated as of October 12, 1994, among
the LTV Corporation, the Sellers Named Herein, LTV Steel Company, Inc., as the Servicer
and LTV Sales Finance Company, as the Purchaser, attached as Exhibit B to the Affirmation
of Michael Friedman [hereinafter the Friedman Affirmation], In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 100 filed January 9, 2001). The Friedman Affirmation, as well
as the other pleadings in the LTV case, is available at http://216.205.189.186/pdf/100.pdf
(last visited May 6, 2002), but the documents attached to the Friedman are not. As of May 6,
2002 the docket for the LTV case and the pleadings files can be found at
http://216.205.189.186.
Attachments not available can be ordered from the source
referenced at that web site. This site also be accessed through the LTV Corporation web site
at http://www.ltvsteel.com, which has a link to the "Bankruptcy Docket".
Use
http://www.ltvsteel.com in lieu of numbered address (last visited and valid May 6, 2002).
See Revolving Credit Agreement Dated as of October 12, 1994, among LTV Sales
Finance Company the Financial Institutions Parties Hereto as Banks, the Issuing Banks, and
the Facility Agent and Collateral Agent, attached as Exhibit A to the Friedman Affirmation, In re
LTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 100 filedJan. 9, 2001).
See, e.g., Voluntary Petition of LTV Steel Co., Inc., In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. I filed Dec. 29,2000).
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the loss of 17,500jobs. On that very same day, the court entered
an interim order permitting the temporary use of the receivables
and setting a hearing on the allegations raised by the LTV.88
The investor moved for modification of the interim order,
which the court denied. s9 After discovery, the filing of briefs and an
expert report by the investor,90 and the filing of amici briefs on
behalf of the securitization industry, 9' the debtor and the investor
See Emergency Motion for (1) Order Granting Interim Authority to Use Cash
Collateral and (2) Scheduling and Establishing Deadlines Relating to a Final Hearing;
Memorandum and Points and Authorities at 1-4, In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio) (doc. no. 28 filed December 29, 2000) [hereinafter Debtor's Emergency Motion].
' Interim Order (1) Authorizing Debtors to Obtain Post-Petition Financing or Use Cash
Collateral Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 363, 364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), 364(c)(3), and
507(b) and (2) Granting Adequate Protection to Pre-Petition Parties, In reLTV Corp., No. 0043866, at 1-5 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 41 filed December 29, 2000). In my view, the LTV
case was substantially affected by an "inventory securitzation" that LTV entered into in 1998.
In this transaction, LTV's steel producers sold their inventory of raw material to an SPE and
hired an LTV affiliate to process the raw material into steel products that the SPE then sold.
The "inventory" securitization used the techniques of securitization, but it is not properly
speaking a "securitization" in that it does not securitize financial assets but instead attempts to
securitize operations. Hence, it is more accurately characterized as a sale and consignment
arrangement. Standard and Poor's Ratings Group refers to these types of transactions as
"hybrid" transactions. See STANDARD & POOR'S RATING SERVICES, LEGAL ISSUES IN RATING
STRUCTURED FINANCE TRANSACTIONS 115-19 (2000).
If there had been no inventory
securitization, I believe that it would have been much more difficult for the debtors to get an
interim order allowing them to repudiate the receivables securitization. Most of the
allegations that the LTV securitizations were disguised secured transactions focused on the
inventory securitization and the fact that the investor in that securitization depended so
heavily on the operations of the LTV affiliate "servicing" the raw material by turning it into
steel products. See, e.g., Debtor's Emergency Motion, supranote 87, at 7-9, 14-16.
' See Emergency Motion by Abbey National Treasury Services PLC for Modification of
Interim Order Entered on December 29, 2000 and Objection to such Order, In re LTV Corp.,
No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 98 filed January 9, 2001); Order and
Memorandum Opinion [denying the Emergency Motion], In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 366 filed February 5, 2001).
' See Notice of Abbey National Treasury Services PLC of Filing Its Supplemental
Memorandum in Opposition to Debtors' Emergency Motion for Final Order Granting
Authority to Use Cash Collateral Under Seal, In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D.
Ohio) (doc. no. 524 filed February 20, 2001); Expert Report Witness of Thomas E. Plank Filed
Under Seal, In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 584 filed March 2,
2001).
" Motion for Leave to File a Memorandum on Behalf of Amici Curiae in Opposition to
the Debtors' Emergency Motion for an Order Granting Interim and Final Authority to Use
Cash Collateral, In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 500 filed
February 20, 2001) [hereinafter Motion of Securitization Amici]; Memorandum of
Securitization Amici Curiae In Opposition to Debtors' Emergency Motion for (1) Order
Granting Interim and Final Authority to Use Cash Collateral, In re LTV Corp., No. 00-43866
(Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 502 filed February 20, 2001) [hereinafter, Memorandum of
Securitization Amici]; Brief of The New York Clearing House Association L.L.C. as Amicus
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entered into a settlement agreement by which the investor, among
others, agreed to provide debtor in possession financing, the sellers
repurchased the receivables sold to the SPE, and the debtor
conceded that the sale of the receivables had been a true sale. On
March 20, 2001, the court entered an order approving the terms of
the settlement and specifically finding that the sale of the
receivables to the SPE had been a true sale of the receivables.93
Undoubtedly, a significant factor in the settlement was the fact that
LTV's attempt to repudiate a properly structured securitization to
save 17,500 jobs would destroy an industry that provided trillions of
dollars of lower cost financing to many borrowers, including LTV.94
This result suggests that, despite the aversion of some bankruptcy
professionals to securitization, the economic importance of the
securitization industry will successfully thwart efforts by prodebtor
groups to eliminate or reduce true securitizations.
On the other hand, the securitization industry does not appear
strong enough to extend legislatively the benefits of securitization to
transactions that do not entail a true sale of assets to an SPE. In the
bankruptcy legislation that has been percolating in Congress the last
several years, the securitization industry had succeeded in inserting
a section, § 912 of the current bill, that would modify § 541 of the
Code to exclude assets that had been "transferred" in a
"securitizaion." 5 So long as the securities were rated at least
Curiae In Opposition to Debtors' Emergency Motion for (1) Order Granting Interim
Authority to Use Cash Collateral, In reLTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no.
507 filed February 20, 2001) [hereinafter Brief of New York Clearing House Association].
" Final Order Authorizing Debtors Pursuant to 11 U.S.C. §§ 105, 361, 362, 363,
364(c)(1), 364(c)(2), and 364(c)(3) to (A) Obtain Post-Petition Financing and (B)
Repurchase Certain Inventory, Accounts Receivable and Adequate Protection Claims, 5 at 78, 111, at 11, In reLTV Corp., No. 00-43866 (Bankr. N.D. Ohio) (doc. no. 734 filed March 20,
2001).
Id. 11,at1l.
Motion of Securitization Amici, supranote 91, at 1-2 (identifying as the "Securitization
Amici" several steel companies who sell asset-backed securities to fund their operations,
issuers of asset-backed securities, trade associations, investors, and undervriters);
Memorandum of Securitization Amici, supra note 91, at 17, 18, 20 (stating that accepting
"LTV's extreme legal arguments and disregarding the structure of the LTV transactions could
cause a seismic disruption in the capital markets" and LTV's motion "is an attack on a major
funding technique that benefits manufacturers, consumers, investor, and creditors alike");
Brief of The New York Clearing House Association, supra note 91, at 4 (noting that LTV's
motion would sacrifice the form of financing that successfully aided its earlier rehabilitation
and adversely affect thousands of companies with millions of employees as well as millions of
investors).
See Bankruptcy Reform Act of 2001, S. 420 107th Cong. § 912 (2001), entitled
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"Asset-Backed Securitizations":
Section 541 of title 11, United States Code, as amended(1) in subsection (b), by inserting after paragraph (7), as added by this Act,
the following:
(8) any eligible asset (or proceeds thereof), to the extent that such
eligible asset was transferred by the debtor, before the date of
commencement of the case, to an eligible entity in connection with an
asset-backed securitization, except to the extent such asset (or proceeds
or value thereof) may be recovered by the trustee under section 550 by
virtue of avoidance under section 548(a); and
(2) by adding at the end the following new subsection:
(f) For purposes of this section(1) the term 'asset-backed securitization' means a transaction in which
eligible assets transferred to an eligible entity are used as the source of
payment on securities, including, without limitation, all securities issued by
governmental units, at least one class or tranche of which was rated investment
grade by one or more nationally recognized securities rating organizations,
when the securities were initially issued by an issuer;
(2) the term 'eligible asset' means(A) financial assets (including interests therein and proceeds thereof),
either fixed or revolving, whether or not the same are in existence as of
the date of the transfer, including residential and commercial mortgage
loans, consumer receivables, trade receivables, assets of governmental
units, including payment obligations relating to taxes, receipts, fines,
tickets, and other sources of revenue, and lease receivables, that, by their
terms, convert into cash within a finite time period, plus any residual
interest in property subject to receivables included in such financial
assets plus any rights or other assets designed to assure the servicing or
timely distribution of proceeds to security holders;
(B) cash; and
(C) securities, including without limitation, all securities issued by
governmental units;
(3) the term 'eligible entity' means(A) an issuer; or
(B) a trust, corporation, partnership, governmental unit, limited liability
company (including a single member limited liability company), or other
entity engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and transferring
eligible assets directly or indirectly to an issuer and taking actions
ancillary thereto;
(4) the term 'issuer' means a trust, corporation, partnership, or other entity
engaged exclusively in the business of acquiring and holding eligible assets,
issuing securities backed by eligible assets, and taking actions ancillary thereto;
and
(5) the term 'transferred' means the debtor, under a written agreement,
represented and warranted that eligible assets were sold, contributed, or
otherwise conveyed with the intention of removing them from the estate of
the debtor pursuant to subsection (b) (8) (whether or not reference is made to
this title or any section hereof), irrespective and without limitation of(A) whether the debtor directly or indirectly obtained or held an
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investment grade, the assets would be considered "transferred" if
the debtor in a written agreement represented and warranted that
the assets were sold with the intention of removing them from the
estate of the debtor.96 Hence, § 912 appears to allow an originator
to remove from the property of its potential bankruptcy estate assets
that were not truly sold. In essence, investors in securities who
obtained an investment grade rating secured by such eligible assets
still owned by the debtor would no longer have to pay the
bankruptcy tax that would fund the reorganization efforts of the
debtor.
Although I am skeptical that the effects of § 912 would be as
beneficial as its sponsors hope or as harmful as its critics fear, § 912
drew the ire of some bankruptcy academics.97 Nevertheless, the fate
of § 912 seemed to be tied up in the fate of the larger Bankruptcy
Reform Act of 2001, although there has been the possibility of
enacting § 912 as part of smaller bill dealing with financial
markets. 8 The apparent fate of § 912 changed dramatically,
however, following the collapse and bankruptcy filing of Enron
Corp. Several bankruptcy academics wrote a letter to Congress on
January 23, 2002 opposing § 912 for a variety of reasons, including a
charge that § 912 would permit future Enrons? and that it would
"render impossible untold corporate reorganizations that would
save jobs and would give most creditors a much higher return from

interest in the issuer or in any securities issued by the issuer;
(B) whether the debtor had an obligation to repurchase or to service or
supervise the servicing of all or any portion of such eligible assets; or
(C) the characterization of such sale, contribution, or other conveyance
for tax, accounting, regulatory reporting, or other purposes.
Section 912 of the house bill is identical. See Bankruptcy Abuse Prevention and Consumer
Protection Act of 2001, H.R 333, 107th Cong. § 912 (2001).
See id.
See, e.g., Lupica, Statutory Institutionalizationof Securitization,supranote 64.
SeeFinancial Contract Netting Improvement Act of 2000, H.R. 1161, 107th Cong. § 13
(introduced in the House January 3, 2001) (using language almost identical to § 912). The
predecessor for this provision in the previous Congress was the Financial Contract Netting
Improvement Act of 1999, H.R. 1161, 106th Cong. § 13 (introduced in the House March 17,
1999).
' See Letter from Alan Axelrod, Professor Emeritus, Rutgers School of Law, Newark, et
al. to Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, dated January 23,
2002, reproduced in 21 AM. BANKR. INST. J. no. 2, Mar. 2002, at 6 available at
www.abiworld.org/resources/research/letterl.html [hereinafter Law Professors' Letter]
(arguing that § 912 "would institutionalize and encourage one of the practices that has led to
Enron's failure and its harsh consequences").
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a company in financial trouble."'00 Other academics also wrote,
° and the Bond Market Association wrote a spirited
criticizing § 912, 10
102
defense.
The fate of § 912 is unclear. In an effort to move the
Bankruptcy Reform Act through the conference committee, House
Republicans offered to delete § 912.103 I would be delighted to see
the demise of § 912, but for reasons much different than most
bankruptcy academics. Contrary to the assertions of the Bond
Market Association in its letter defending § 912,104 and some
bankruptcy academics and practitioners, 5 I believe that the legal
foundations for true securitizations are very firm.'06 Therefore, as
the law professors' letter of January 23, 2002, correctly
acknowledges, ' °7 true securitizations do not need § 912. To the
extent that § 912 is to remove secured transactions from the reach
of the Code, this change should not be limited to only those secured
transactions involving financial assets securing securities with an
investment grade rating and should be made available to all secured
'o See id., reproducedin 21 AM. BANKR. INST.J. no. 2, March 2002 at 38.
10' See Letter from Edward J. Janger, Associate Professor, Brooklyn Law School, et al. to
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, dated January 28, 2002
[hereinafter Janger Letter], available at www.abiworld.org/resources/research/letterl.html;
Letter from KennethJ. Kettering, Associate Professor, New York Law School, et al. to Senator
Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, dated February 5, [hereinafter
Kettering Letter], available at wv.abiworld.org/resources/research/ letterl.html. Both of
these letters present good reasons why Congress should jettison § 912.
' Letter from John R. Vogt, Executive Vice President, Bond Market Association, to
Senator Patrick Leahy and Congressman F. James Sensenbrenner, dated January 30, 2002
[hereinafter BMA Letter],
available at http://www.bondmarkets.com/regulatory/
ABSO13002.pdf.
103 See F. James Sensenbrenner, Chairman, House
Judiciary Committee, Remarks to
Credit
Union
National
Association,
February
27,
2002
(available
at
http://www.house.gov/judiciary/sensenbrenner022702.htm) (reporting that on February 26,
2002, House staff submitted a compromise on bankruptcy reform legislation to the Senate
that included a proposal to strip the asset-securitization provision from the legislation at the
request of the Senate); see also Jonathan C. Lipson, Enron, Asset Securitization and
Bankruptcy Reform: Dead or Dormant?, 11 J. Bankr. L. & Prac. January/February 2002
(criticizing several unjustified aspects of§ 912 and suggesting that it might be resurrected).
"'
See BMA Letter, supranote 102.
o See, e.g., David Gray Carlson, The Rotten Foundationsof Securitization, 39 WMi. & MARYL.
REv. 1055 (1998); Kettering Letter, supranote 101.
"0 This topic is the subject of one of my works in process, tentatively entitled "The Secure
Foundationsof Securitization."
"' See Law Professors' Letter, reproducedin 21 AM. BANKR. INST.J. no. 2, March 2002 at 36
(noting that the "deliberate asset securitization is booming under current law" and that not
every asset securitization is a disguised loan).
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transactions. In any event, it would be ironic indeed if a victory on
the part of the bankruptcy academics on § 912 led to the enactment
of the Bankruptcy Reform Act, which contains many other
provisions of much greater impact on individual debtors that have
been heavily and rightly criticized.""8
If securitization is, as I believe, efficient,'09 then it does not
adversely affect unsecured creditors. It might, however, adversely
affect bankruptcy professionals in another way. If securitization is
efficient, the tremendous cost savings that it generates by avoiding a
significant portion of the bankruptcy tax on secured credit provides
substantial real evidence of the inefficiency of the current
bankruptcy regime. This evidence, coupled with doubts about the
success rates for reorganizations"0 and the lack of any empirical
"o See, e.g., Jean Braucher, Means Testing Consumer Bankruptcy; The Problem of Means, 7
FORDHAM J. CoRe. L. (forthcoming 2002) (arguing that the pending 2002 consumer
bankruptcy legislation adopting a complicated means testing procedure would impose greater
burdens on the innocent, but unfortunate, individual debtor without any significant
reduction in the few abusers of the current bankruptcy process or increase of collections in
bankruptcy) Jean Braucher, Increasing Uniformity in Consumer Bankruptcy: Means Testing as a
Distraction and the National Bankruptcy Review Commission's Proposalsas a StartingPoint, 6 AM.
BANKR. INST. L. REv. 1 (1998) (criticizing means testing in several bills introduced in
Congress in 1998); Melissa B Jacoby, Collecting Debts From The Ill And Injured: The Rhetorical
Significance, But PracticalIrrelevance, Of CulpabilityAnd Ability To Pay,51 AM. U. L. REv. 229, 25362 (2001); Ted Janger, Crystals And Mud In Bankruptcy Law:Judicial Competence And Statutory
Design, 43 AIZ. L. REv. 559, 615-19 (2001) (explaining why the current proposals for means
testing create "a rule that is likely to accomplish virtually none of the stated goals of its
drafters"); Zachary Price, The Bankruptcy Abuse Preventionand ConsumerProtectionAct, 39 HARv.
J. LEIS. 237 (2002) (criticizing the current version of the bankruptcy reform pending in the
107th Congress); Charles Jordan Tabb, The Death Of ConsumerBankruptcyIn The United States?,
18 BANKR. DEv.J. 1 (2001).
' This topic is also subject of another of my works in process, tentatively entitled The
Efficiency of Securitization: The Inefficiency of Bankruptcy. Securitization entails an asset transfer
for fair value. The sale of assets itself does not harm unsecured creditors of the originator.
The unsecured creditors are harmed if the originator uses the proceeds of the sale unvisely or
absconds with the proceeds.
"'
See NATIONAL BANKR. REv. COMM'N, FINAL REPORT BANKRUPTCY: THE NEXT TWENTY
YEARs 610-14 (1997) (noting that "only a small fraction of the Chapter 11 cases filed nationwide end in confirmation of a plan of reorganization" (citations omitted)); see also Steven H.
Ancel & Bruce A. Markell, Hope in the Heartland:Chapter11 Dispositionsin Indiana and Southern
Illinois, 1990-1996, 50 S.C. L. REV. 343, 348-49 (1999) (noting that out of 2,393 Chapter 11
petitions filed in Region 10 of the United States Trustee system [about 1% of all petitions, or
half the national rate] during 1990 through 1996, only 913, or 38%, ended in confirmed
plans; 62% converted to Chapter 7 or were dismissed, and a few were left still open); Susan
Jensen-Conklin, Do Confirmed Chapter11 Plans Consummate? The Results of a Study and an
Analysis of the Law, 97 COM. L.J. 297, 318-19, 324-25, 327 (1992) (finding that only 17% of 260
Chapter 11 petitions filed in the Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York in
Poughkeepsie resulted in confirmed plans, a rate comparable to that found in a national
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basis for the belief that reorganization actually saves jobs, might
produce a strong impetus for curtailing reorganizations under
Chapter 11. Limiting reorganizations under Chapter 11 could have
a dramatic effect on some of the interest groups that benefit from
reorganization."' It remains to be seen whether these elements
would be sufficient to overcome the formidable strength of the
bankruptcy professionals, whose growth is described so well by
Professor Skeel's book.
CONCLUSION

Professor Skeel has produced a masterful account of how the
self interests of bankruptcy professionals has shaped bankruptcy law
through their dominance of both the legislative and judicial arenas.
Nevertheless, as Debt's Dominion describes, underlying the legislative
and judicial development of bankruptcy law are the economic forces
of a constantly changing economic system. The ever-evolving
economy creates new interest groups or transforms existing interest
groups who use the then existing law for their ends. The growth
and financial distress of railroads created the equity receivership
and the role of investment banks and the elite reorganization bar.
The Chandler Act destroyed the particular role of those interest
groups, but they have reappeared in corporate bankruptcy. The
growth of the consumer economy fueled the growth of the
consumer creditor industry, the growth of consumer bankruptcy,
and the growth of consumer advocacy. Similarly, competitive
pressures have induced borrowers, investment bankers, and their
study; only 6.5% resulted in consummated plans and rehabilitated debtors; and the average
time to confirmation was more than 18 months); Grant W. Newton, A Need to Determine
Business Viability, 4 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REv. 536, 536 (1996) (noting that most of the large
number of Chapter 11 petitions filed by small, nonviable business are simply dilatory tactics,
that the assets of the debtors are used by the debtor or its professionals, and that the creditors
receive very little, if any, distribution).
Elizabeth Warren and Jay Westbrook suggest that the reported low rate of success for
reorganization may be somewhat misleading. See Elizabeth Warren &Jay Westbrook, Financial
CharacteristicsofBusiness in Bankruptcy, 73 AM. BANKR. L.J. 499, 523-24, 566 (1999) (reporting
that a large number of Chapter 11 filings may in fact be liquidations, and hence the actual
success rate for true reorganizations may be higher than the reported rates).
I I actually do not think that lawyers suffer much harm if their immediate clients have
less business. Lawyers generally have a great capacity to adjust the nature of their practice as
the economy changes. Much of the resistance of lawyers to change, I believe, derives from a
sincere defense of their clients' interests and also from a natural desire not to have to change
their practice.
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lawyers to create a new economic and legal tool-securitization-that in turn feeds a new set of interest groups that will protect their
interests. Hence, the market will create new economic and legal
structures, like securitization, that will have a dramatic effect on the
future of bankruptcy in which bankruptcy professionals will
undoubtedly play a major role.
The story of this future
development of bankruptcy law will be another fascinating history to
write. Professor Skeel's Debt's Dominion is an essential starting point
for that future history.

